

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 16558 01 OF 04 302144Z

62

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

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P 301514Z OCT 74

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4105

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 MOSCOW 16558

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - T E X T

E.O. 11652 XGDS-3

TAGS: UR, PARM

SUBJ: NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS CONSULTATIONS - VERBATIM OF THIRD

PLENARY OCTOBER 29, MESSAGE NUMBER THREE

1. MEETING OPENED AT 10:30 A.M., MOROKHOV CHAIRING.

VERBATIM FOLLOWS: QUOTE:

MOROKHOV: MR. AMBASSADOR, BEFORE ADDRESSING THE SPECIFIC  
POINTS CONTAINED IN THE PAPER WHICH YOU GAVE US ON OCTOBER 22,  
I WOULD LIKE TO OBSERVE THAT IT APPEARS THAT WE PROCEED FROM  
A BROADER VIEW TO ALL MATTERS DEALING WITH STRENGTHENING  
SAFEGUARDS AND CONSOLIDATING THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE LIST OF QUESTIONS WHICH WE TRANS-  
MITTED SHOULD ALL BE DISCUSSED SOONER OR LATER SINCE THEY  
ARE CONDUCIVE TO A STRICTER REGIME ON NON-PROLIFERATION.  
THE MATTER OF PRIORITIES IN CONSIDERING THE LIST IS NOT  
IMPORTANT SINCE WE COULD ACCEPT THEM IN ANY SEQUENCE. BUT IT  
IS EVIDENT THAT IF WE ARE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED WITH THE  
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF ISSUES  
SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH THE VIEW OF WORKING OUT AN  
AGREED APPROACH. WE ARE CONVINCED OF THIS AND HOPE  
THAT YOU SHARE OUR VIEW.

SO, IF WE ARE GOING TO ADDRESS THESE QUESTION, WE  
WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING MATTER:

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SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 16558 01 OF 04 302144Z

WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE US DOCUMENT WHICH YOU PRESENTED

ENTITLED POTENTIAL COMMON NUCLEAR EXPORT AND SAFEGUARDS POLICIES, ALONG WITH ITS ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION AT A PROPOSED CONFERENCE OF KEY EXPORTERS. WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH MATTERS RELATING TO THE ORGANIZATION OF SUCH A CONFERENCE.

THE SOVIET SIDE ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE AGREEMENT OF AUGUST 22, 1974 WHICH WAS REACHED BETWEEN KEY EXPORTERS ON EXPORT OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND TECHNOLOGY AS CALLED FOR UNDER ARTICLE III.2 OF THE NPT. THIS WOULD HELP TO LIMIT PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS AND WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A STRICTER REGIME ON NON-PROLIFERATION.

WE BELIEVE, AND FROM YOUR DOCUMENT IT APPEARS THAT YOU SHARE OUR VIEW, THAT ADDITIONAL MEASURES SHOULD BE TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT ARTICLE III.2. IN OUR VIEW, WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON EXPANSION OF THE GROUP OF COUNTRIES WHICH ARE PARTY TO THE ZANGGER AGREEMENT. AT PRESENT, FOURTEEN STATES ARE MEMBERS, BUT AT A RECENT SESSION OF THE IAEA, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF POLAND AND THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC EXPRESSED THEIR DESIRE TO JOIN IN THIS AGREEMENT. SO THE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES IN AGREEMENT WITH ARTICLE III.2 WILL BE SIXTEEN. AS FAR AS I KNOW, CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS ALSO EXAMINING THE ISSUE OF JOINING THIS AGREEMENT.

HOWEVER, THIS AGREEMENT DOES NOT INCLUDE SUCH BIG NUCLEAR EXPORTERS AS FRANCE, ITALY, EGYPT, SOUTH AFRICA, SPAIN, SWITZERLAND, NIGER AND OTHERS. NO DOUBT THE ADHERENCE OF THESE COUNTRIES TO THE AGREEMENT WOULD STRONGLY INCREASE ITS INFLUENCE AND AVOID CIRCUMVENTION OF IAEA CONTROLS. AT THIS POINT, WE SHOULD CONSIDER HOW TO INVITE OTHERS TO AGREE AND DEVISE WAYS TO INVOLVE PRESENT PARTIES IN MORE ACTIVE WORK TO EXPAND THE NUMBER OF PARTIES.

NOW I WOULD LIKE TO OFFER A FEW COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC MATTERS IN YOUR DOCUMENT. FIRST, ON PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B), COMPARING THE WORDING OF THESE WITH IAEA

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 16558 01 OF 04 302144Z

(INCIRC) 209, IT IS EVIDENT THAT THESE WORDINGS ARE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME. THE DIFFERENCE LIES IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EFFECTIVE DURATION OF INCIRC 209. IN THIS CONTEXT, WHAT CAN YOU SAY AND WHAT RESULTS ARE TO BE EXPECTED FROM YOUR PROPOSED CONFERENCE? WE NEED TO ESTABLISH WHAT WILL BE DISCUSSED AND WHAT WORK WILL BE CONDUCTED UNDER PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B). THESE DISCUSSIONS COULD INVOLVE: FIRST, THE

QUESTION OF ESTABLISHING AN AGREED EFFECTIVE TERM FOR OBLIGATIONS OF IMPORTING COUNTRIES AND EFFECTIVE TERM FOR IAEA SAFEGUARDS; SECOND, THE QUESTION OF AGREEMENT ON MEASURES TO INVOLVE OTHER STATES IN AGREEMENTS ON EXPORT PROCEDURES; AND, THIRD, DEEPEN AND STRENGTHEN INCIRC 209, ELABORATING ON WORDING OF THE MEMORANDA THEMSELVES.

THE LAST POINT, IN OUR VIEW, COULD BE DISCUSSED AS FOLLOWS:

(1) THE EXPANSION OF THE LIST OF EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL WHOSE EXPORT REQUIRES APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS, AND, IN THIS REGARD, WE HAVE A CANADIAN PROPOSAL OF A TECHNICAL NATURE.

(2) DEVELOPMENT OF STRICTER REQUIREMENTS FOR STATES WHICH RECEIVE NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT.

IN THIS CONNECTION WE INVITE YOUR ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT UNDER THE NPT, PARTIES PUT ALL NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES UNDER IAEA CONTROL. MEMORANDA ON EXPORT PROCEDURES ENVISAGE THAT ALL ACQUIRED MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT AND ANY MATERIALS MANUFACTURED WITH THE HELP OF SUCH MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT WILL BE SUBJECT TO IAEA SAFEGUARDS. IN THIS RESPECT, PARTIES ARE AT A DISADVANTAGE WITH RESPECT TO NON-PARTIES.

WE THEREFORE SUGGEST DISCUSSING QUESTION OF CORRECTING THIS SITUATION THROUGH AGREED INTRODUCTION OF THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS:

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 16558 01 OF 04 302144Z

(1) INCLUSION IN THE AGREEMENT ON EXPORT OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT ON THE TRIGGER LIST, AND REQUIRING THAT THE RECEIVING STATE ASSUME THE OBLIGATION NOT TO USE ANY MATERIAL IN THE COUNTRY FOR ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE.

(2) AGREEMENT IN THE TRIGGER LIST THAT THE RECEIVING STATE SHOULD PUT ALL NUCLEAR MATERIALS IN THE COUNTRY UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS.

(3) AGREEMENT ON UNIFORM AND EFFECTIVE TERM OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS.

ALSO INSTITUTED COULD BE AN ADDED REQUIREMENT THAT THE RECEIVING SIDE SHOULD ADHERE TO AGREED EXPORT

PROCEDURES FOR NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT. WE BELIEVE INTRODUCTION OF SUCH REQUIREMENTS WOULD BLOCK THE SIGNIFICANT LOOPHOLE WITH RESPECT TO NON-PARTIES USING FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO MAKE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES.

ANOTHER IMPORTANT ISSUE RELATED TO PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) IN YOUR DOCUMENT IS THE ISSUE OF INCREASING EFFECTIVENESS OF APPLICATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS UNDER

SECRET

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 16558 02 OF 04 301709Z

42

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

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P 301514Z OCT 74

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4106

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 4 MOSCOW 16558

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ARTICLE III.2. AS IS KNOWN, THE IAEA IN SUCH CASES APPLIES THE PROVISIONS OF AN OLDER CONTROL SYSTEM KNOWN AS INCIRC 66 WHICH WAS WORKED OUT MANY YEARS AGO. WE THINK THIS SYSTEM SHOULD BE IMPROVED AND UNIFIED WITH THE NEW DOCUMENT INCIRC 153 (BLUE BOOK). IT WOULD ALSO BE APPROPRIATE TO CONSIDER WORKING OUT A MODEL AGREEMENT ON SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT AS IT APPLIES TO ARTICLE III.2.

WE AGREE WITH YOUR VIEW IN PARAGRAPH (C) THAT SUPPLIERS OF WEAPONS-GRADE NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND CHEMICAL PROCESSING OR URANIUM ENRICHMENT TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT TO NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO SPECIAL RESTRAINTS. IN OUR VIEW, THE BEST OF SUCH RESTRAINTS COULD BE AN AGREED REQUIREMENT THAT EXPORT OF THESE ESPECIALLY DANGEROUS MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT TO NON-PARTIES SHOULD BE BANNED. IN THE COURSE OF SUPPLYING THESE ESPECIALLY DANGEROUS

MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT TO MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES,  
THE CONDITION SHOULD BE THAT ALL PRTICIPATING COUNTRIES  
SHOULD BE PARTIES TO THE NPT. AS A RESULT, NON-PARTIES  
COULD ONLY RECEIVE FABRICATED REACTORS AND FUEL  
ELEMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF THEIR POWER INDUSTRY AND  
NUCLEAR RESEARCH.

WE SHOULD ALSO DISCUSS JOINT MEASURES TO HAMPER  
THE APPEARANCE IN COMING YEARS OF URANIUM ENRICHMENT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 16558 02 OF 04 301709Z

AND CHEMICAL REPROCESSING PLANTS BELONGING TO  
NON-PARTIES TO NPT. SUCH MEASURES COULD INCLUDE:

(1) A PROHIBITION ON PROVISION OF INFORMATION  
ON THE MOST IMPORTANT UNITS OF EQUIPMENT AND DETAILS  
OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROCESSES FOR URANIUM ENRICHMENT  
AND CHEMICAL REPROCESSING, ESPECIALLY THOSE REQUIRING  
NEW TECHNOLOGY.

(2) PROVISIONS ON EXPORT OF MOST IMPORTANT UNITS  
OF EQUIPMENT FOR URANIUM ENRICHMENT AND CHEMICAL  
REPROCESSING.

(3) STABILIZING THE PRICES FOR SERVICES THAT ARE  
RENDERED FOR URANIUM ENRICHEMENT.

WITH REGARD TO PARAGRAPH (D) OF YOUR DOCUMENT,  
WE ARE PREPARED TO DXCUSS AGREED REGULATIONS FOR  
PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT.  
THE IAEA ELABORATED ON THIS MATTER IN 1972 AND DEVELOPED  
SUCH RECOMMENDATIONS BUT REGRETTABLY THEY WERE NOT MADE  
OBLIGATORY FOR THE PARTIES. I SAY REGRETTABLY, SINCE  
THE SOVIET EXPERT AT THE IAEA HAS INSISTED ON MAKING  
THE RECOMMENDATIONS OBLIGATORY BUT UNFORTUNATELY,  
THIS WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY OTHER EXPERTS.

SOVIET AND US EXPERTS AS WELL AS EXPERTS FROM  
FRANCE, THE FRG, HUNGARY, JAPAN, THE UK AND INDIA  
ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN WORKING OUT THIS RECOMMENDA-  
TION WHICH IN OUR VIEW IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE  
NEED FOR MINIMUM PROTECTION OF MATERIAL AND CAN BE  
USED AS A BASIS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT. THE  
QUESTION CAN BE DISCUSSED OF HOW THESE REQUIREMENTS  
CAN BE MADE OBLIGATORY FOR IMPORTING STATES IRRESPECTIVE  
OF THEIR NPT STATUS.

ON PARAGRAPH (E) WE BELIEVE THAT THESE QUESTIONS  
WOULD BE RESLOVED WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEASURES  
WE HAVE PROPOSED IN CONNECTIONS WITH YOUR PARAGRAPHS

(A), (B) AND (C). HOWEVER, I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR YOUR COMMENTS IF YOU HAVE ANY. THAN YOU, MR. AMBASSADOR.

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SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 16558 02 OF 04 301709Z

END QUOTE.

2. VERBATIM OF STOESSEL STATEMENT FOLLOWS: QUOTE:  
I HAVE TAKNE NOTE OF YOUR STATEMENT AND I THINK THAT WE HAVE MUCH IN COMMON. WE ARE AWARE THAT YOU ARE INTERESTED IN A BROAD RANGE OF QUESTIONS, BUT, WHILE WE APPRECIATE THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE QUESTIONS, WE FEEL THAT SOME OF THEM SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN A DIFFERENT FORUM.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENT US-SOVIET CONTACTS HERE SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO SPECIFIC PROBLMES, IN PARTICULAR, MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT OF KEY NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS TO STRENGTHEN SAFEGUARDS AND CONTROL OVER EXPORTS AND DEVELOP A COMMON POLICY AMONG THE KEY SUPPLIERS.

YOU HAVE INDICATED THAT YOU ARE INTERESTED IN ENCOURAGING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ZANGGER COMMITTEE GUIDELINES RECOMMENDATION AS STATED IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF YOUR DOCUMENT. WE SUPPORT THE SAME GOAL BUT WE WISH, IN ADDITION, TO BUILD ON THAT RESULT TO GAIN SUPPORT OF SUPPLIERS WHO DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN IT AND TO FORMULATE MULTILATERAL RESOLUTIONS ON EXPORT RESTRAINTS NOT SPECIFICALLY COVERED IN THE COMMITTEE'S GUIDELEINES.

AS I SAID BEFORE, WE FEEL THAT THE BEST APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM WOULD BE BY ORGANIZING A SMALL, PRIVATE CONFERENCE OF KEY SUPPLIER COUNTRIES.

I NOTED THAT YOU MENTIONED IN YOUR STATEMENT THAT OTHER COUNTRIES MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN THE CONFERENCE. WE FEEL THAT THOSE COUNTRIES I MENTIONED SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN A SMALL CONFERENCE SINCE THEY ARE THE KEY SUPPLIERS WHO EXPORT NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY. THEREFORE, WE BELIEVE THAT THE CONFERENCE WOULD BE MORE PRODUCTIVE IF RESTRICTED TO THOSE PARTICIPANTS.

WE DO, HOWEVER, EXPECT IN DUE COURSE TO CONSULT ALL OTHER SUPPLIERS TO ASSURE THAT A FULLY EFFECTIVE  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 16558 02 OF 04 301709Z

INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM IS INSTITUTED. A SMALL CONFERENCE WOULD PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE PART IN ASSURING MORE WIDESPREAD EFFORTS BY ALL NUCLEAR INDUSTRIAL STATES.

MR. MINISTER, I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT IN OUR CONTACTS HERE WE ENVISAGE RELATIVELY BRIEF CONSULTATIONS WHICH, I HOPE, WILL RESULT IN AN AGREEMENT ON THE DESIRABILITY OF CONVENING A CONFERENCE OF KEY SUPPLIERS, AND ALSO ON THE ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED IN THAT FORUM. I'LL HAVE FURTHER COMMENTS LATER AND ELABORATE ON SOME ITEMS IN THE US PAPER.

I HOPE THAT MY REMARKS AND YOURS WILL BRING US CLOSER TOGETHER AND WILL RESULT IN SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN CONSIDERATION OF THESE MATTERS. THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. END QUOTE

MOROKHOV: QUOTE: THANK YOU, MR. AMBASSADOR BUT I'M AFRAID THERE HAS BEEN A MISUNDERSTANDING. WHEN I MENTIONED BROADER PARTICIPATION OF OTHER COUNTRIES, I DID NOT REFER TO THEIR PARTICIPATION IN YOUR PROPOSED CONFERENCE. THE QUESTION OF THE CONFERENCE IS CURRENTLY BEING EXAMINED, AND TODAY I HAVE NOT EXPRESSED ANY OPINION ON WHETHER WE ARE FOR OR AGAINST THAT CONFERENCE. WHEN I SPOKE OF BROADER PARTICIPATION, I REFERRED TO THE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WHO WOULD ACCEDE TO THE EXISTING AGREEMENT ON ARTICLE III.2 OF AUGUST 22. IT IS IMPORTANT TO GET MORE COUNTRIES TO PARTICIPATE AND GET STRICTER PRIORITIES OF ARTICLE III.2.

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 16558 03 OF 04 301740Z

42

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

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P 301514Z OCT 74

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4107

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 4 MOSCOW 16558

EXDIS

AS TO THE PROBLEM OF THE CONFERENCE, THIS IS  
BEING EXAMINED AND, AT THIS TIME, I CANNOT SAY YES  
OR NO, OR COMMENT ON WHAT OUR POSITION WILL BE  
VIS-A-VIS PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE. WE SIMPLY  
ARE NOT YET READY.

I BELIEVE THAT DEVELOPMENT OF OUR POSITION  
TOWARDS THE PROPOSED CONFERENCE WOULD BE FACILITATED  
BY MORE INFORMATION ON ITS AGENDA, ORGANIZATION, DATE,  
ORDER OF PROCEDURE, ETC. AND ALL RELATED MATTERS.  
THAT WOULD HELP US ARRIVE AT A DECISION. WE WOULD  
LIKE TO HEAR THIS FROM YOU SINCE YOU ARE THE  
INITIATOR, SO THAT WE CAN WEIGH THESE FACTS. THE  
MORE WE HEAR, THE EASIER IT WILL BE FOR US TO SOLVE  
THIS QUESTION.

AS FOR THE URGENCY OF THIS QUESTION, AND THE US  
POSITION THAT IT SHOULD BE HIGH ON THE PRIORITY LIST,  
WE HAVE NO DOUBT ABOUT IT BEING URGENT, BUT ITS  
URGENCY IS A FUNCTION OF A LACK OF EFFORT ON OTHER  
MATTERS AS WELL. WE WOULD NOT HAVE THIS PROBLEM IF  
ALL COUNTRIES ABLE TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND  
TECHNOLOGY WERE PARTIES TO THE NPT.

I NOTE THAT SOME OF THE COUNTRIES YOU PROPOSE  
FOR THE CONFERENCE, I.E., FRANCE, JAPAN, AND THE  
FRG ARE NOT NPT PARTIES. IT WOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 16558 03 OF 04 301740Z

FOR THEM TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS (TIMERBAEV  
INTERJECTED: FRANCE IS PRODUCING NUCLEAR ARMS).  
THEREFORE, THE QUESTION WE PROPOSED FOR DISCUSSION  
IN OUR BROAD AGENDA INVOLVES ENCOURAGEMENT OF  
PARTICIPATION IN NPT, EXPECIALLY BY NEAR-NUCLEAR  
COUNTRIES WHO COULD SOON START PRODUCTION OF  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ARE EXPORTERS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL  
AND EQUIPMENT. WE MUST SOLVE THIS PROBLEM TO AVOID  
FURTHER NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION.

YOU TAKE A VERY NARROW VIEW OF THIS ISSUE WHICH  
DOES NOT INCLUDE RELIABLE INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS.  
THE PRLBLEM IS URGENT AND YOU WOULD HAVE NO GUARANTEE  
THAT SOMEONW WILL NOT START PRODUCING NUCLEAR MATERIAL.

WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW, AND THAT IS IMPORTANT,  
WHETHER YOUR VIEW ON THE BROAD SOVIET AGENDA IS

NEGATIVE, OR IS YOUR VIEW NOT YET FINAL, SO THAT WE  
CAN REPORT TO HIGHER LEVELS?

IF YOU ARE REALLY WORRIED ABOUT NON-PROLIFERATION OF  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS THEN WE NEED A WHOLE RANGE OF MEASURES  
TO PUT THINGS IN ORDER.

BUT IF WE ARE TO CONSIDER THIS CONFERENCE, THE  
IMPRESSION IS SELF-INVITING THAT IT WOULD BE A  
CONFERENCE OF COMPETING EXPORTING COUNTRIES WHO  
WOULD TRY TO ENSURE THAT NO COUNTRY TAKES ADVANTAGE  
OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION. THEREFORE THE SOVIET  
UNION IS NOT INTERESTED IN DISCUSSIONS AMONG NUCLEAR  
COUNTRIES SEEKING TO ENSURE THEIR MARKETS AND, IF THIS  
IS THE PURPOSE OF THE CONFERENCE, WE WILL NOT PARTICI-  
PATE. IF THE TRUE PURPOSE OF THE CONFERENCE IS TO  
STRENGTHEN THE REGIME OF NON-PROLIFERATION, THEN WE  
ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER IT.

WE HAVE STUDIED SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER'S  
REMARKS AT THE UNGA AND SENATOR SYMINGTON'S AS WELL,  
AND WE BELIEVE THAT THE AMERICAN APPROACH IS SIMILAR  
TO OURS.

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SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 16558 03 OF 04 301740Z

THUS, WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY WE SHOULD LIMIT  
OURSELVES TO A NARROW CONFERENCE OF EXPORTERS WHEN  
YOUR SECRETARY OF STATE TAKES A BROADER VIEW.

IF THIS IS NOT THE PROPER PLACE OR TIME, OR THE  
LEVEL IS NOT APPROPRIATE -- PLEASE LET US KNOW SO  
THAT I CAN REPORT TO MY AUTHORITIES. TELL US WHERE  
AND WHEN THESE OTHER TOPICS COULD BE DISCUSSED. DOES  
THE US SIDE PROPOSE TO CONSULT THE SOVIET SIDE ON  
IT? THANK YOU. END QUOTE.

STOESSEL: QUOTE: THANK YOU FOR CLARIFYING YOUR VIEW  
ON CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS. I NOTED YOUR QUESTIONS  
ABOUT DETAILS OF THE CONFERENCE SUCH AS ITS AGENDA,  
ORGANIZATION AND TIMING. SUBSEQUENTLY, I WILL  
ELABORATE ON THE SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION AT THIS CON-  
FERENCE, BUT THE TIMING WILL BE DETERMINED BY CONSULTATIONS  
WITH OTHER PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES. INCIDENTALLY,  
MR. MINISTER, WE DO PLAN TO CONSULT THESE COUNTRIES  
AND DISCUSS THESE DETAILS. WE STILL HAVE NOT BEGUN  
THESE OTHER CONSULTATIONS, BUT WHEN WE DO, WE WILL  
ALSO INFORM THEM OF OUR CONSULTATIONS HERE. WE WOULD  
LIKE TO BE IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH YOU ON FURTHER

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. THIS WOULD NOT AFFECT THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF OUR TALKS WITH RESPECT TO PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WHICH WE AGREED ON EARLIER.

I NOTED IN YOUR REMARKS THAT SOME SUGGESTED PARTICIPANTS AT THE PROPOSED CONFERENCE ARE NON-MEMBERS OF NPT. THIS IS CORRECT, BUT ALL OF THE COUNTRIES WE HAVE MENTIONED ARE KEY NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS. WE CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL TO INCLUDE THEM BECAUSE WE ARE TRYING TO DEVELOP COMMON EXPORT POLICIES AMONG ALL KEY NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS AND THIS REQUIRES A SPECIAL FORUM SUCH AS WE HAVE PROPOSED.

I NOTED YOUR QUESTION WHETHER THE CONFERENCE WILL HAVE A COMMERCIAL OBJECTIVE. NO, THAT IS NOT WHAT WE WANT TO DISCUSS. WE INTEND TO DISCUSS STRENGTHENING NUCLEAR EXPORT SAFEGUARDS AND NOT TO DEAL

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 16558 03 OF 04 301740Z

WITH COMMERCIAL POLICIES AND MARKET DEVELOPMENT.

YOU MENTIONED BROADER ISSUES INCLUDING, IN PARTICULAR, THE QUESTION OF INCREASING ADHERENCE TO THE NPT. WE FULLY SUPPORT THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE, AS WELL AS OF THE OTHER RELATED QUESTIONS ON NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

AS YOU NOTED, OUR GENERAL VIEW ON NON-PROLIFERATION WAS RECENTLY DISCUSSED BY OUR SECRETARY OF STATE AND SENATOR SYMINGTON AND AS THEIR REMARKS INDICATED, WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE GLOBAL ASPECTS OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION PROBLEM. HOWEVER, I MUST REPEAT AS I HAVE SAID FREQUENTLY THAT AT THIS TIME WE ARE INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING A CONFERENCE OF KEY SUPPLIERS. OTHER ISSUES, SUCH AS THE NPT, WILL BE, AS BEFORE, DISCUSSED IN OTHER FORUMS. ALSO, I WOULDN'T WANT TO EXCLUDE ANY OTHER TYPES OF CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN THE FUTURE. HOWEVER, AT THIS TIME, I MUST STRESS THAT WE ARE RESTRICTED TO DISCUSSING THE POINTS I HAVE MENTIONED.

MR. MINISTER, I REGRET THAT I MUST LEAVE NOW. WE WILL MEET AGAIN THIS AFTERNOON ON OTHER MATTERS, BUT COULD HAVE A PRIVATE DISCUSSION ON THIS SUBJECT IF YOU WISH. END QUOTE.

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 16558 04 OF 04 301851Z

42

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

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P 301514Z OCT 74

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4108

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 4 MOSCOW 16558

EXDIS

MOROKHOV: QUOTE: AS A FINAL REMARK, WE MUST BE SURE  
THAT WE DO NOT HARBOR ILLUSIONS ABOUT THIS CONFERENCE.

OUR EXPERIENCE WITH THE ZANGGER COMMITTEE WAS  
THAT NOT ALL THE COUNTRIES WHO ACTIVELY WORKED IN  
DEVELOPING ITS GUIDELINES ADHERED TO THEM.

FOR EXAMPLE, ALTHOUGH THE CHAIRMAN WAS FROM  
SWITZERLAND, SWITZERLAND DID NOT SIGN THE AGREEMENT.  
THEREFORE, LET US BE SURE THAT THIS CONFERENCE WILL  
SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE. END QUOTE

3. IT WAS AGREED THAT NEXT MEETING WOULD BE HELD ON  
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 31, AT 3:30 P.M. MEETING ENDED AT  
12:10 P.M.

4. WE ASSUME THAT THE PROPOSED CONFERENCE WILL BE  
CONVENED ASAP, PREFERABLY BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR,  
AND THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY TAKE PLACE IN WESTERN  
EUROPE. PLEASE ADVISE OF ANY DETAILS, INCLUDING ANY  
CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER KEY PARTICIPANTS.

5. AT NEXT MEETING WE WILL COMMENT ON SOVIET PAPER  
AND ELABORATE ON OUR OWN SUGGESTED TOPICS DRAWING  
FROM GUIDANCE FURNISHED IN STATE 236888.

STOESSEL

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## Message Attributes

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